Ipswich 2-2 Norwich City: Ben Lee's Canaries tactical report

Ben is a City season ticket holder and author of the NCFC Analysis social media account, who unpicks Canaries' games with an analytical report highlighting tactical strengths and weaknesses.

This is what Ben made of an eventful first East Anglian duel since 2019.

Ipswich Vs Norwich: The Derby

Score: 2 – 2

Possession (%): 65 – 35

Passes: 575 – 308

Shots: 18 – 11

xG: 2.07 – 0.81

• Ipswich’s rotations in settled possession.
• Norwich’s more aggressive pressing variation.
• Manipulating Norwich’s defensive structure.
• Predictable build-up play.

Base formations

Heading into the first East Anglian derby since 2019, with Ipswich hoping to end Norwich’s fourteen-year unbeaten run, it was Kieran McKenna’s side who were undoubtedly favourites.

Even north of the border, many fans would concede McKenna’s impact has been impressive; but this was derby day, and such games are rarely predictable.

Both sides set up in 4-2-3-1 base formations, but differing rotations meant the two teams transitioned into a variety of structures throughout the game.

Much of Saturday’s game was played with Ipswich in settled possession, so it would make logical sense to begin by analysing Ipswich in possession and Norwich’s press.

In their deep build-up, McKenna’s side created a clear 4-2-3-1 shape, with Morsy (5) and Luongo (25) in a double pivot at the base of their midfield. Norwich transitioned into their usual 4-1-3-2 structure in their high pressing phases, as Nunez (26) joined the second line of pressure behind Idah (11) and Barnes (10).

Broadhead (33), Chaplin (10), and Burns (7) were often tilted towards Ipswich’s right, with the hosts frequently playing out down that side. In such scenarios, Chaplin (10) tended to drop deep into his own half to overload the right side.

The hybrid roles included within Norwich’s high pressing structure created a ball-side man-to-man press. On the visitor’s left, for example, the front two aggressively pressed the goalkeeper and ball-side centre-back, while Sainz (7) pressed Clarke (2), Nunez (26) jumped onto Morsy (5), and Rowe (27) stayed tight to Luongo (25).

Chaplin (10) was crucial in facilitating Ipswich’s controlled escape, especially given Norwich’s ball-side man-to-man press.

On occasion, McCallum (15) followed Chaplin (10) when he dropped deep, and in response, Burns (7) moved high and wide to exploit the space vacated by Norwich’s left-back. But when Chaplin (10) beat McCallum (15) in 1v1s, Wagner’s side were vulnerable.

Later in the first half, Ipswich began a similar build-up pattern. But this time it was Nunez (26) who tracked Chaplin (10), while McCallum (15) stayed back with Burns (7).

When Ipswich progressed into periods of settled possession, McKenna’s men created a 3-2-4-1 with a situational back three. Clarke (2) became a hybrid left centre-back, while Davis (3) advanced to hug the touchline on the left, with Broadhead (33) inverting from the right.

In response, Norwich occasionally created an aggressive 4-2-4 variation of their usual 4-4-2 mid-block. Sainz (7) and Rowe (27) joined the strikers in a front four, while Idah (11) and Barnes (10) attempted to keep the host’s double pivot in their cover shadows.

A pass from Woolfenden (6) to a wide centre-back triggered Norwich’s ball-side winger to press, leaving space for an Ipswich pivot to create an angle to receive. These passes broke through Norwich’s first line, taking four players out of the game instantly, leaving Nunez (26) and Sara (17) in a 4v2 against Ipswich’s midfield box.

After playing through the first pressing line, Ipswich were able to manipulate Norwich’s press further with coordinated rotations designed to create and occupy space.

For example, with Chaplin (10) moving out to the right touchline and Burns (7) pinning McCallum (15) in the last line, Sara (17) was forced to shift out to the wing. This created space for Morsy (5) to receive in the right half space. In response, Nunez (26) shifted over to the same side, creating a ball-side overload in Norwich’s favour.

But football is a game of trade-offs; a ball-side overload creates a far-side underload. While they could, perhaps, have done so more quickly, Ipswich responded to these situations by shifting the ball over to target Norwich’s far-side weakness.

When defending in their own half, Norwich dropped back into their usual 4-4-2 defensive structure.

Morsy (5) frequently dropped deeper than Luongo (25) to receive the ball from the centre-backs; this created a staggered double pivot, with Luongo (25) occupying space behind and between Norwich’s first line of pressure.

The fluidity and coherence of Ipswich’s rotations often effectively manipulated Norwich’s individual pressing roles.

Davis (3), for instance, occasionally dropped on the left to drag Stacey (3) out of position. Luongo (25) would then advance into the space behind Norwich’s right-back, while Broadhead (33) dropped into the space vacated by Luongo (25).

On occasion, such rotations successfully dissociated Norwich’s markers. Had the host’s execution of final actions been on point, Norwich’s defensive unit may have been exploited with more serious consequences.

In Norwich’s deep build-up phases, their usual 4-2-4 shape with two deep-lying forwards became more of a 4-2-1-3, with Idah (11) advancing beyond Barnes (10). In response, McKenna’s Ipswich created a 3-2-4-1 pressing structure.

Despite conceding a 3v1 in the first line, Ipswich created a man-oriented press with a plus one in the last two lines. Burgess (15) and Clarke (2) tracked the wingers, while Morsy (5) or Luongo (25) tracked Barnes (10).

Norwich’s deep build-up patterns were somewhat one-dimensional throughout. Their attempts to play out almost exclusively involved playing to a full-back, who would try to access the pivot behind a pressing winger.

This is the same pattern Norwich regularly attempt, and it has become far too predictable. With Chaplin (10) and Broadhead (33) staying tight to Norwich’s double pivot, this pattern rarely worked. Typically, Norwich’s response was to play hopeful long balls towards Idah (11) or the wingers.

In settled possession, Nunez (26) dropped between Norwich’s centre-backs as the full-backs advanced to provide the width. With the wingers inverting and Barnes (10) often dropping deeper than Idah (11), Norwich created their usual 3-1-3-3 shape. In these phases, Ipswich transitioned back into their 4-2-3-1 base formation.

The two Ipswich pivots tracked Barnes (10) and the ball-side winger, while the far-side full-back stayed tight to the opposite winger. This left Norwich’s furthest full-back free for a switch, but Ipswich effectively shifted across to re-mark players on the other side.

Norwich rarely managed to break Ipswich down during these phases, with the hosts frequently forcing Norwich back into their own half. Their response was, yet again, to play over the host’s press to relieve pressure, but this is not a reliable solution.

Ultimately, Ipswich’s processes were better than Norwich’s, but the latter dealt with key moments more effectively. Processes create moments, but moments decide games.

From a tactical perspective, the performances of both sides reflected the current disparity between the two sides. Both create clear structures with and without the ball, but Ipswich’s patterns are superior – that, I’m afraid, is a coaching issue.

But it doesn't take away from the significant context of the result. Norwich fans were not merely ‘celebrating a draw’; they were celebrating the continuation of a fourteen-year Derby Day unbeaten run.

Unfortunately, however, Ipswich have now set the standard for sustained success. Norwich require lasting performance improvements, along with more considered recruitment, if they’re to see similar success again in the future.

You can read all Ben's previous analysis of Norwich City games via his social media accounts.

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